

Appendix A

The Communist Logistics System in South Vietnam

I. Organization

*No changes*

The Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) continues to function as the principal organization responsible for internal VC logistics operations in South Vietnam. Within the COSVN structure the three organizations responsible for logistics are; the Finance and Economic Section, the Forward Supply Council, and the Rear Services Section. In theory the Finance and Economic Section procures necessary money and supplies through its taxation and other fund raising functions whereas the Forward Supply Council is responsible for keeping military units supplied with foodstuffs and manpower, with the Rear Services Section providing a logistical and medical planning and support function. In practice the three organizations have interrelated functions in the VC logistical system. These organizations exist at all levels from COSVN to district and in some cases to village level. Supply Councils are particularly important, exercising control and supervision over communications and liaison sections\* as well as the work of the two basic transportation organizations---Finance and Economic Section transport elements and military Rear Service Section transport elements.

\* (including guides, security personnel, and station attendants)

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*(No change  
(w/ footnotes)*

Enemy forces in South Vietnam in December 1966 amounted to 265,000-285,000, including between 18,000-19,000 combat support personnel. The composition of the VC combat support force is shown in the following tabulation.

Headquarters, Staff and Technical Personnel (Combat Support)

COSVN Headquarters	4,000
Region Headquarters	3,000
Province Headquarters	800
Sappers (Combat Engineers)	700
Intelligence/Reconnaissance	700
Guard	400
Production	3,000
Transportation Corridor -	6,000
Operations & Communications/ Liaison	<u>6,000</u>
Total	18,600 *

II. Capabilities of the Communist Logistical Supply SystemA. Personnel

*None*

As of 1 October, 1966 the VC had general control over 19% of the population, about 2,900,000 people. In the aggregate the VC do not lack logistical support personnel. A VC force of 300,000 would not be expected to encounter widespread labor shortages when they have a population of 2.9 million at their disposal from which to recruit laborers.

\* Represents MACV's OB. ACSS adds over 26,000 other support soldiers, including boat crews, transport units, and communications personnel. These personnel are not included in MACV's OB.

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In addition to the population under their control, the VC are also capable of drawing manpower from areas undergoing clearing operations, areas which in October of this year contained 2.9 million people or roughly 19% of the population as well as drawing from areas undergoing security, areas which in early October of this year contained 800,000 people or 5% of the population. Laborers remain the primary work force for VC logistical operations. Because most of the motorized means of transport are unavailable to or cannot be used by the VC, civilian laborers are a major asset to the VC transportation system, particularly in the Central Highlands.

B. Transportation

*no  
change*

The VC in South Vietnam maintain a large number and variety of lines of communication in South Vietnam. The VC continue to use trucks in some of their logistic support activities in VC controlled areas and where feasible sampans and shallow draft boats are employed. Other forms of transport which are being utilized in significant amounts are trains of oxcarts, elephants, and three-wheeled lambrettas. In the delta the VC depend on water as their basic means of transportation. Watercraft presently employed by the Communists in the delta vary from small three-man sampans with a draft of a few inches to large types with a draft of several feet. The exact number of boats available to the enemy is not known, but COMUSMAC-V estimates that the enemy has enough watercraft not only to maintain the present level of combat

in the delta, but sufficient numbers to increase the level of operations.

The VC continue to have reasonable success in countering interdiction in the Delta by moving at night or covertly by day, making maximum use of camouflage, maintaining advance and rear units to warn of approaching aircraft, as well as sinking boats for later recovery when detection seems imminent.

C. Storage and Distribution

The VC continue to operate an area supply system which incorporates a large number of small depots, each generally having a capacity of five-ten tons--- dispersed throughout areas in which VC units operate. This system has the advantage of limiting the damage that can be caused by the destruction of one large depot or supply cache. Even in the larger war zones supplies are frequently dispersed over a wide area. In addition, war zones provide the advantage of generally being situated in areas which are sparsely populated and/or populated by ethnic or religious minorities hostile to the South Vietnamese governments.

III. Vulnerabilities of the Communist Logistics Supply System

A. 1. Material Losses

*Some screening*  
Quantities of enemy war material that have been destroyed, damaged, or captured have probably effected some serious supply shortages when the VC logistical structure, however, the full impact of these losses cannot be accurately measured since we are lacking hard information on available VC stockpiles. Enemy material losses inflicted by US and allied forces during recent months as

compiled from available data for selected categories of supplies are shown below. Complete data on communist material losses are unavailable at the present time. The data appearing in the following tables represent losses from significant Allied operations and does not represent total losses.

Table I

Enemy Material Losses 12 May - 31 July 1966

<u>Grenades</u> (Captured)	8,500
<u>Large Cal Ammo</u> (Rounds Captured)	15,000
<u>Small Arms Ammo</u> (Rounds Captured)	390,000
<u>Mines</u> (Captured)	2,300
<u>Food</u> (tons destroyed)	6,000
(tons captured)	2,900
<u>Medical supplies</u> (tons destroyed)	2
<u>POL</u> (gallons destroyed)	3,300
(gallons damaged)	80,000
(gallons captured)	4,200
<u>Cloth</u> (yards destroyed)	62,500
(yards captured)	36,000

Weapons

Table II

Enemy Material Losses 31 July - 19 November 1966

<u>Grenades</u> (captured)	35,000
<u>Large Cal Ammo</u> (rounds captured)	6,500
<u>Small Arms Ammo</u> (rounds captured)	715,000
<u>Mines</u> (captured)	5,100
<u>Food</u>	Incomplete data
<u>Medical Supplies</u>	Incomplete data
<u>POL</u>	Incomplete data
<u>Cloth</u>	Incomplete data

Table III

Weapons Loss Summary \*

	<u>3rd Qtr-1966</u>	<u>Oct.-1966</u>	<u>Nov.-1966</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC Crew Served	404	172	100	676
Individual	3,982	1805	858	6,645

Table IV

Market Time Operations

<u>Cargo Seized</u>	<u>Mar-Nov 1966</u>
Ammunition	4,600 rounds
War material **	90 tons

Table V

Naval Gunfire Support Operations and Results

(April - October 1966)

<u>I Corps</u>	<u>II Corps</u>	<u>III Corps</u>	<u>IV Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Structures</u>				
destroyed	8,990	2,865	147	547
damaged	12,243	3,351	105	1,478

Table VI

Game Warden - Naval Surveillance Activities

(July - October 1966)

Structures

damaged	56
destroyed	147

Suspect Vessels

damaged	38
destroyed	124
captured	15

\* includes those seized in Market Time Operations

\*\* includes ammunition, 1100 rifles and machine guns, and 27 artillery pieces.

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2. B-52 Strikes

B-52 bombings continue to adversely affect the VC economy. The destruction of structures and other vital supplies are resulting in some disruption of the VC logistics and communications system. These strikes have also facilitated ground operations into VC redoubts. In addition, it appears that the bombings have forced the enemy to make recent changes in tactics and plans. A captured VC directive stressed the need for increased personnel security, more effective camouflage, dispersion of bivoac areas, and an increase in guard and patrol activities. Troops are now being stationed along the periphery of base areas rather than entirely within them, thus forcing the enemy to delay or abandon planned attacks. Exact estimates of damage inflicted are presently impossible because of limitations of imagery interpretation and the limited number of ground follow-up operations.

B. Potential Labor Shortages

In the future the VC may experience an increase in the squeeze on manpower in view of the flow of refugees out of VC territory, heavy casualties, the VC draft, and the gradual increase in the number of hamlets pacified by the government.

C. Problems of Food Distribution

VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have daily logistical requirements for Class I (Food), Class II (Weapons), Class III (POL),

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Class IV (quartermaster, engineer, and medical), and Class V (ammunition). Of these five classes the most pressing problem for the VC at this time appears to be related to the distribution of food rations.

Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most of their food supplies within the country. Although these forces control sufficient rice production to satisfy all VC/NVA food requirements, substantial quantities of rice are apparently being transported from Cambodia to every controlled rice deficit areas in South Vietnam, mainly because of the problems associated with internal transport and distribution of large amounts of bulk supplies.

The principal rice-deficit areas with large troop concentrations include the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Marlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc, all in the II Corps area, and Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and the northern part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If VC and NVA troops in these areas were made completely dependent on Cambodian sources for food, Cambodia would be providing about 20% of the total daily food requirement for all Communist main force units in South Vietnam--between 25 and 30 tons of rice per day, or about 10,000 tons annually.

There have been a number of recent reports citing food shortages among enemy forces, particularly those located in the Central Highlands. One of these reports described an October 1966 meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee in Quang Ngai province

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between I and IV Corps. The IV Corps area with only 15% of the total VC/NVA regular forces is the area in which the VC have the greatest self-sufficiency in logistic supplies, particularly foodstuffs. A large share (20%) of the confirmed enemy combat force in South Vietnam is concentrated in food deficit areas. The II and III Corps areas which are the predominant rice deficit areas, account for almost 2/3 of the total daily logistic requirement (all classes) for VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam. At the present time the total daily logistic requirement for VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam is estimated to be on the order of 160 tons per day.

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